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Abstract
We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we
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any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such
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value). We show that the existence of strongly stable networks is equivalent to
core existence in a derived cooperative game and use that result to characterize
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1 Introduction
The importance of networks in a variety of social and economic settings is well-
documented. Applications range from social networks such as friendships to more
directly economically motivated ones such as trading alliances, decentralized market
relationships, research partnerships, etc. Given that network relationships matter, it
is important to understand which networks are likely to form and how this depends
on the structure of the setting. In particular, there has been a good deal of recent
research into understanding how networks form among a group of individuals (people,
firms, etc.) who have the discretion to choose with whom they interact.1
In this paper, we continue that line of research through a careful study of the
existence and properties of strongly stable networks: those networks which are stable
against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. Strongly stable networks are
those which are supported by strong Nash equilibria of an appropriate game of network
formation.
There are many reasons for studying a strong notion of stability based on coalitional
considerations. In network formation, individual or pairwise based solution concepts
such as Nash equilibrium and pairwise stability (see Jackson and Wolinsky (1996))
often lead to many stable networks, so that they provide broad predictions. In some
contexts this already narrows things, but in other contexts it may leave us with a
large set of networks. Moreover, these networks may have very di?erent properties and
then additional considerations may help us to sort among them to produce narrower
and more accurate predictions of network formation. (See Example 1, in section 2.1
below, for an illustration.) In addition, in many contexts, there will naturally be
communication among individuals that may allow a number of them to coordinate
their choices of links. As such, we study strongly stable networks as a natural way for
making tighter predictions using coalitional considerations. One can think of a notion
such as pairwise stability as a weak stability concept which is essentially a necessary
(and some times too weak) condition for stability, while strong stability is a su?cient
(and some times too strong) condition for stability.
Strong stability of networks is a very demanding property, as it means that no set of
players could benefit through any rearranging of the links that they are involved with
(including those linking them to players outside the coalition). As such, we expect there
1For bibliographies on network study generally and network formation in particular, we refer the
reader to Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001) and Dutta and Jackson (2002).
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to be contexts where such networks will not exist. However, strongly stable networks
still exist in a number of natural settings, including some that pop up in the literature
as examples of network situations. In situations where strongly stable networks exist
they are quite compelling, in the sense that once formed such networks are essentially
impossible to destabilize, as there is no possible reorganization that would be improving
for all of the players whose consent is needed.
Another reason for examining the existence of strongly stable networks, beyond
their compelling stability properties, is that such networks exhibit additional prop-
erties. For instance, as we shall show, if a network is strongly stable and has more
than one component, then value must be allocated equally among members of each
component, and in fact the per capita value must be equal across components. This is
a very strong equity property. More importantly, strongly stable networks have strong
e?ciency properties. One obvious property is Pareto e?ciency. But if the value of each
component of a network is allocated equally among the members of that component
of a network, then when strongly stable networks exist they exhibit even stronger e?-
ciency properties. In this case, strongly stable networks maximize the overall value of
the network. This statement actually takes a bit of proof as we shall show. Although it
is obvious if a network consists of just one component, it is more subtle when e?cient
networks consist of several components.
Motivation for the study of the existence of networks that are e?cient and satisfy
some stability requirement comes out of the previous literature. From previous re-
search, we know that there are a variety of contexts where the stability of networks can
be at odds with e?ciency. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) show that for some settings the
sets of pairwise stable networks and e?cient networks do not intersect. Moreover, for
some value functions they showed that this is true regardless of how value is allocated
or transferred among players, provided the allocation respects component balance and
anonymity (which are formally defined below). Jackson (2002) goes on to show that
even a weaker form of e?ciency is at odds with pairwise stability, and that in some
very natural contexts even Pareto e?ciency can be widely incompatible with pairwise
stability.
The tension between stability and e?ciency suggests several directions for further
study. One is to examine whether the tension disappears if we are free to construct the
allocation rule in careful and non-anonymous ways. This angle is pursued by Dutta
and Mutuswami (1997) who show that careful construction of allocation rules that
may be non-anonymous (on unstable networks) can restore the compatibility between
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e?ciency and stability.2 Another direction is to identify those settings for which there is
no tension between stability and e?ciency (or at least that there is an overlap between
the two) when keeping with anonymity. That direction is pursued both in Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) and Jackson (2002), when the concept in question is pairwise stability.
The current paper is in that same spirit, but moves beyond pairwise stability to strong
stability. As we shall see, e?cient networks and strongly stable networks will coincide
when the latter exist. Of course, the existence of strongly stable networks is of interest
beyond e?ciency, given that such networks are robust to all kinds of deviations, as we
have already discussed above.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide definitions and an
example in which we compare strong stability to pairwise stability. In Section 3 we first
show that the existence of strongly stable networks requires an egalitarian allocation.
Next, we characterize the existence of strongly stable networks under the component-
wise egalitarian allocation rule in terms of nonemptiness of the core of a closely related
cooperative game. We use this in Section 4 to obtain a characterization of the value
functions for which there exist strongly stable networks, showing that a “top convexity”
condition is both necessary and su?cient. We provide applications of these results to a
variety of settings. In Section 5 we move on to consider side payments, showing that the
characterizations in the previous sections relating to the component-wise egalitarian
allocation rule are in fact necessary for any allocation rule when strong stability allows
for side payments. Finally, we close the paper with some results on non-anonymous
value functions in Section 6 and some concluding remarks in Section 7.
2 Definitions
Networks
There is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of players who may be involved in network relation-
ships.
2Another interesting direction, not as closely related to what we examine here, is to study situations
where the allocation rule and networks are formed simultaneously and endogenously. This is explored
in Currarini and Morelli (2000), Mutuswami and Winter (2000) and Slikker and van den Nouweland
(2001b). As shown by Currarini and Morelli (2000), at least for some bargaining protocols, e?ciency
can be regained in some settings.
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Non-directed graphs are used to model the network relations between players.3
In such a graph the nodes (vertices) correspond to the players and the links (edges)
correspond to bilateral relationships between players. Let gN be the set of all subsets
of N of size 2, and similarly for any S ? N let gS be the set of all subsets of S of size
2. G = {g | g ? gN} is the set of all possible networks or graphs on N .
The link between players i and j is denoted by ij.
A network g induces a partition ?(g) of the player set N , where two players i and
j are in the same partition element if and only if there exists a path4 in the graph
connecting i and j (using the convention that there is a path from each player to him
or herself). A network g is connected if ?(g) = {N}. For any S ? ?(g), g(S) denotes
the subgraph of g on the set S, i.e. g(S) = g ? gS.
The components of a network g, denoted C(g), are defined by C(g) = {g(S)|S ?
?(g), |S| ? 2}. The restriction that |S| ? 2 rules out empty networks as components.
The Value of a Network
The value of a network is given by a value function v : G? IR. We normalize v so
that v(?) = 0. The set of all such value functions is denoted V .
A value function is anonymous if for any permutation of the set of players ? (a
bijection from N to N), v(g?) = v(g), where g? = {?(i)?(j)|ij ? g}.
Anonymity says that the value of a network is derived from the structure of the
network and not the labels of the players who occupy certain positions. For many of
the results we will restrict our attention to anonymous value functions, and we discuss
extensions to non-anonymous value functions in a later section of the paper.
A value function is component additive if v(g) =
P
h?C(g) v(h) for all g ? G.
Component additivity precludes that the value of a given component of a network
depends on how other components are organized. This precludes externalities across
components of a network. However, it still allows for externalities within components.
That is, the value of a given component, and ultimately each player’s payo?, can depend
on the way that the network is structured. For example, the value of {12, 23} can di?er
from {12, 23, 13}, and so, for instance, player 2’s payo? may depend on whether 1 and
3 are linked.
Allocation Rules
3For some analysis of network formation in directed networks see Bala and Goyal (2000) and Dutta
and Jackson (2000). The general problem of strong stability in directed networks has not been studied.
4Formally, a path in g from i to j is a sequence of players i1, . . . , iK such that ikik+1 ? g for each
k ? {1, . . . ,K ? 1}, with i1 = i and iK = j.
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An allocation rule is a function Y : G × V ? IRn describes how the value of a
network is distributed among the players. The payo? of player i ? N in network g
with a value function v under allocation rule Y is denoted Yi(g, v).
The allocation function may arise naturally, or might also represent additional
transfers of value among players. We can be agnostic on whether the allocation rule
arises naturally, is derived from some bargaining among players, or is forced by some
government or other intervening party.
An allocation rule Y is component balanced if
P
i?S Yi(g, v) = v(g(S)) for each
component additive v, g ? G and S ? ?(g).
Component balance requires that the value of a given component of a network is
allocated to the members of that component in cases where the value of the component
is independent of how other components are organized. This would tend to arise
naturally. It also is a condition that an intervening planner or government would like
to respect if they wish to avoid secession by components of the network.
An allocation rule Y is component decomposable if Yi(g, v) = Yi(g(S), v) for each
component additive v, g ? G, S ? ?(g), and i ? S.
Component decomposability requires that in situations where v is component ad-
ditive, the way in which value is allocated within a component does not depend on
the structure of other components. So, in situations where there are no externalities
across components, the allocation within a component is independent of the rest of the
network.
An allocation rule Y is anonymous if for any v ? V , g ? G, and permutation of
the set of players ?, Y?(i)(g?, v?) = Yi(g, v), where the value function v? is defined by
v?(g) = v(g?
?1
) for each g ? G.
Anonymity of an allocation rule requires that if all that has changed is the la-
bels of the players and the value generated by networks has changed in an exactly
corresponding fashion, then the allocation only change according to the relabeling.
Given any component additive v ? V , the component-wise egalitarian allocation
rule Y ce is defined by
Y cei (g, v) =
v(g(Si))
|Si| ,
where Si ? ?(g) is the unique partition element containing player i. Y ce splits the
value v(g) equally among all players if v is not component additive.
The component-wise egalitarian rule is one where the value of each component is
split equally among the members of the component; provided this can be done - i.e.,
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within the limits of component additivity. This allocation rule is anonymous, compo-
nent balanced, and component decomposable, and satisfies nice egalitarian properties
in terms of equalizing payo?s.
As we shall see, this allocation rule will actually emerge naturally if one wishes to
have strongly stable networks, and will play a key role in the characterization of value
functions that allow such networks.
E?ciency and Stability Notions
A network g is e?cient with respect to v if v(g) ? v(g0) for all g0 ? G.
We denote the set of networks that are e?cient with respect to value function v by
E(v).
Note that an e?cient network always exists since there are only finitely many
networks in G. This is a strong notion of e?ciency as it requires the maximization
of total value. It only corresponds to Pareto e?ciency if the value is freely and fully
transferable across all components of a network.5
The following definition of coalitional deviation is used in defining the strong sta-
bility notion.
A network g0 ? G is obtainable from g ? G via deviations by S if
(i) ij ? g0 and ij /? g implies ij ? S, and
(ii) ij ? g and ij /? g0 implies ij ? S 6= ?.
The above definition identifies changes in a network that can be made by a coalition
S, without the need of consent of any players outside of S. (i) requires that any new
links that are added can only be between players in S. This reflects the fact that
consent of both players is needed to add a link. (ii) requires that at least one player
of any deleted link be in S. This reflects that fact that either player in a link can
unilaterally sever the relationship.
A network g is strongly stable with respect to allocation rule Y and value function
v if for any S ? N , g0 that is obtainable from g via deviations by S, and i ? S such
that Yi(g
0, v) > Yi(g, v), there exists j ? S such that Yj(g0, v) < Yj(g, v).
We denote the set of networks that are strongly stable with respect to Y and v by
SS(Y, v).
5For discussion of this and some weaker notions of e?ciency see Jackson (2002).
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The definition of strong stability we use here is slightly stronger (i.e., harder to
satisfy) than that originally introduced by Dutta and Mutuswami (1997). The defi-
nition of strong stability here allows for a deviation to be valid if some members are
strictly better o? and others are weakly better o?, while the definition in Dutta and
Mutuswami (1997) considers a deviation valid only if all members of a coalition are
strictly better o?. For many value functions these definitions coincide.
There are several reasons for working with this stronger definition of strong stability.
First, it implies pairwise stability whereas the Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) version of
strong stability does not quite imply pairwise stability.6 Second, this stronger definition
allows for a stronger implication in Theorem 2, where we conclude that under certain
conditions on the value function all e?cient networks are strongly stable. Third, the
converse of this statement in Theorem 2 is only true with the stronger definition of
strong stability. Finally, if all members of a coalition are weakly better o? and some
strictly better o?, then any ability of members to make even tiny transfers will result
in a deviation. As we compare the definition of strong stability with what happens
when transfers are possible, this slightly stronger notion of stability is natural.
Such di?erences between weak and strong inequalities are common to definitions of
Pareto e?ciency, the core, strong Nash equilibrium, and coalitional stability properties;
and the di?erence sometimes has consequences. In working with the stronger definition
here, one ends up with a more attractive solution when it is non-empty, but in cases
where it is empty one might also wish to examine the weaker solution.
We remark that the strongly stable networks correspond exactly to the strong Nash
equilibria of the network formation game suggested by Myerson (1991). In that game
players simultaneously announce the set of players with whom they wish to be linked
and a link between two players forms if and only if both players have named each
other.7
6Pairwise stability (from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)) is defined as follows. A network g ? G is
pairwise stable with respect to allocation rule Y given a value function v ? V if no player benefits
from severing one of their links and no two players benefit from adding a link between them, with one
benefiting strictly and the other at least weakly. This last part of the definition is what makes our
version of strong stability compatible with pairwise stability but the Dutta and Mutuswami version
incompatible.
7The equivalence holds for the corresponding definition of strong Nash equilibrium which requires
that there are no deviations by a coalition that make all members weakly better o? and some strictly
better o?. There are some details to verify, as there are some strong Nash equilibria where one player
names another but is not reciprocated. It is easy to check that the networks formed in such equilibria
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Cooperative Games and the Core
A TU cooperative game is a pair (N,w), where N is the set of players and w : 2N ?
IR defines the productive value of each subset of N . In line with this interpretation
w(?) = 0.
As we fix N throughout our analysis, we often refer to a characteristic function
w : 2N ? IR as a cooperative game.
An allocation x ? IRN is in the core of w if
P
i?N xi = w(N) and
P
i?T xi ? w(T )
for all T ? N .
2.1 A Comparison of Pairwise and Strong Stability
To help understand some of the motivation for looking at strong stability, let us examine
an example where the di?erence from pairwise stability becomes clear.
Example 1 A Trading Network
The following example is based on one from Jackson and Watts (1998).
The society consists of n individuals who get value from trading goods with each
other. In particular, there are two consumption goods and individuals all have the same
utility function for the two goods which is Cobb-Douglas, u(x, y) = (xy)
1
2 . Individuals
have a random endowment, which is independently and identically distributed. A
individual’s endowment is either (1,0) or (0,1), each with probability 1/2.
Individuals can trade with any of the other individuals in the same component of
the network. For instance, in a network g = {12, 23, 45}, individuals 1, 2 and 3 can
trade with each other and individuals 4 and 5 can trade with each other, but there is
no trade between 123 and 45. Trade flows without friction along any path and each
connected component trades to a Walrasian equilibrium. This means, for instance, that
the networks {12, 23} and {12, 23, 13} lead to the same expected trades. However, if
there are costs of forming links, then these two networks will lead to di?erent costs.
The gains from trade in the network g = {12} are as follows. There is a 1
2
probability
that one individual has an endowment of (1,0) and the other has an endowment of (0,1).
They then trade to the Walrasian allocation of (1
2
, 1
2
) each and so their utility is 1
2
each.
There is also a 1
2
probability that the individuals have the same endowment and then
must be strongly stable networks.
9
there are no gains from trade and they each get a utility of 0. Expecting over these
two situations leads to an expected utility of 1
4
.
Not accounting for the cost of links, the expected utility for an individual of being
connected to one other individual is 1
4
. The expected utility for an individual of being
connected (directly or indirectly) to two other individuals is
?
2
4
. It is easily checked that
the expected utility of an individual is increasing and strictly concave in the number
of other individuals that she is directly or indirectly connected to, ignoring the cost of
links.
For the purpose of illustration, consider a situation where n = 3 and the cost
to a link is slightly above 1/2 and split equally among all members of the relevant
component. In this case, there are two types of pairwise stable networks. One type
is a network with two links, so that all three players can trade with each other. The
other is a network with no links. The network with no links is ine?cient, and it is
only pairwise stable since players only consider adding a link with one other player at
a time - and the costs from doing this outweigh the gains. However, if all three players
can coordinate, then adding two links makes all of them better o?.8 The networks with
two links are the only networks that are strongly stable in this example.
This example is just one where strong stability provides an e?ective and natural
refinement of pairwise stability.
3 The Existence of Strongly Stable Networks, E?-
ciency and the Core
Let us begin by showing that strong stability has some particular implications about
the structure of the allocation rule that must be in place.
Theorem 1 Consider any anonymous and component additive value function v ? V .
If Y is an anonymous, component decomposable, and component balanced allocation
rule and g ? G with ?(g) 6= {N} is a network that is strongly stable with respect to Y
and v, then Y (g, v) = Y ce(g, v) and Yi(g, v) =
v(g)
n
for each i ? N .
The proof of this theorem and all other results are collected in the appendix.
8There are other possible reasons to think the two link network might form as well, which have to
do with forward looking players who can anticipate the future continuations due to their actions, as
in Page, Wooders, and Kamat (2001).
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Theorem 1 says that if we find strong stability of a network that is not connected,
then the allocation must be as it would be under the component-wise egalitarian rule
and in fact must involve an equal split of the total value of the network. The idea behind
the proof is quite simple and very compelling. Suppose that value is not being split
equally. Then, some player in some component (or perhaps completely disconnected)
is getting a payo? below that of some other player in some other component and
could deviate together with the other members of the second component to provide an
improving deviation.
Theorem 1 shows that a component-wise egalitarian allocation of value will neces-
sarily play a prominent role in the analysis of strongly stable networks.
The condition in the theorem that ?(g) 6= {N} is critical to the result. This is
demonstrated in the following example.
Example 2 A Strongly Stable Network with One Component.
The are three individuals. Networks with two links have value 2.5, the complete
network has value 3, and other networks have 0 value. Consider the allocation rule
where the middle player in a two link network (e.g., player 2 in {12, 23}) gets a payo?
of .1 and the other two players get a payo? of 1.2, in the complete network each player
gets 1 and in networks with at most one link each player gets 0. In this example, any
network with two links is strongly stable. This relies on all players being part of a
single component in g.
As we will see below, the strong stability of the two link network under the non-
egalitarian allocation rule in the previous example depends critically on the inability
of players to make transfers to each other. Otherwise, they would deviate to form the
complete network. We return to make this point formally in Section 5 below.
To get insight into the role of component decomposability in the theorem, consider
the following example.
Example 3 The Role of Component Decomposability.
There are n = 6 players. Let v be defined by v({12, 23}) = 10, v({12}) = 4, and
v is anonymous and component additive, so permutations of the above networks have
the same value, and v({12, 23, 45}) = 14, v({12, 23, 45, 56}) = 20, v({12, 34, 56}) = 12,
and so on. For any other structure of a component (that has three or more links) we
let v have a value of 0.
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On e?cient networks such as {12, 23, 45, 56}, set Y1({12, 23, 45, 56}) = Y3({12, 23, 45, 56}) =
Y4({12, 23, 45, 56}) = Y6({12, 23, 45, 56}) = 3, and Y2({12, 23, 45, 56}) = Y5({12, 23, 45, 56}) =
4. Also, set Y1({12, 23, 45}) = Y1({12, 23}) = Y3({12, 23}) = Y3({12, 23, 45}) = 5,
Y2({12, 23, 45}) = Y2({12, 23}) = 0, and, in accordance with anonymity and compo-
nent balance, Y4({12, 23, 45}) = Y4({45}) = Y5({45}) = Y5({12, 23, 45}) = 2. Set Y
elsewhere to respect anonymity and component balance.
Note that {12, 23, 45, 56} is strongly stable, and yet Y di?ers from the component-
wise egalitarian rule. In particular, Y adjusts on {12, 23} depending on how 4, 5, and
6 are linked, if at all. We have done this in such a way to preclude blocking by a
coalition involving some players from {1, 2, 3} and players from {4, 5, 6}. However, the
allocation rule Y violates component decomposability.
Given the implications of Theorem 1 we focus on the component-wise egalitarian
rule in what follows. This is with a loss of generality, as Theorem 1 does not imply that
Y must equal Y ce on all networks, or in cases where all players are in a single component,
as indicated above. For instance, it is possible that an allocation rule happens to split
value equally on some networks and not others, and happens to split equally on the
strongly stable networks. While this is of interest, for now we concentrate on the
component-wise egalitarian rule. We will return to consider more general allocation
rules when we discuss transfers.
Given a value function v, let the cooperative game (N,wv) be defined by
wv(S) = max
g?gS
v(g).
Thus, every value function v ? V defines a cooperative game where the value of a
coalition is the maximum value it can obtain by arranging its members in a network.
Note that if v is anonymous, then wv is symmetric (so wv(S) = wv(T ) whenever
|S| = |T |). Also, if v is component additive, then wv is superadditive. That is,
wv(S ? T ) ? wv(S) + wv(T ) whenever S ? T = ?.
Theorem 2 Consider any anonymous and component additive value function v ? V .
Some e?cient g ? G with respect to v is strongly stable with respect to Y ce(·, v) if
and only if the core of wv is nonempty. Moreover, SS(Y ce, v) 6= ? if and only if
E(v) = SS(Y ce, v).
Theorem 2 shows that our interest in guaranteeing that a society forms e?cient
networks is closely tied to the non-emptiness of the core of a related cooperative game.
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This allows us to make use of the substantial knowledge on core existence in cooperative
game theory to analyze the e?ciency of network formation.
On a superficial level Theorem 2 seems obvious, since both strong stability and
the core notion allow for deviations by arbitrary subsets of players.9 However, there
are several levels on which Theorem 2 is not obvious (which can also be seen from
the proof). Moreover, these less obvious points are those which result in some of the
theorem’s power and usefulness, as we will discuss in what follows.
In particular, some of the di?erences are as follows. Strong stability allows for a
deviating coalition to maintain links with non-deviating players (and keeps the rest of
the network intact), while the core notion requires complete separation by a deviating
coalition. This gives better opportunities for a coalition to improve under the strong
stability notion. Working in the other direction is that the core allows for transfers
to be made among players in a deviating coalition regardless of how that coalition
derives its value, while under component balance a deviating coalition under the strong
stability notion cannot make transfers across components of a new network that is
formed. With these two critical di?erences, there is no obvious reason to expect the
relationship outlined in the theorem to hold in general. Moreover, the last part of the
theorem shows that it is not simply that there exists a network that is strongly stable
with respect to Y ce(·, v), but that the e?cient networks and strongly stable networks
with respect to Y ce(·, v) coincide.
Application to Communication Networks and Convex Games
A special type of value function are those derived from some anonymous production
function that depends on the players who can communicate. The production function
is represented by a characteristic function z(S) which indicates the productive value
of any coalition S, provided they can communicate through the network. Each link in
a network incurs a cost c.
9With the strong stability notion in Dutta and Mutuswami (1997), where a deviation is valid only
if all members of a coalition are strictly better o?, the equivalence does not hold. An example shows
this. There are 5 players. We describe an anonymous and component additive value function v. A
network encompassing 3 players has value 7 and a network encompassing 2 players has value 3. A
network that consists of two 2-player components and one isolated player has value 6 and a network
that consists of one 2-player component and one 3-player component has value 10. All other networks
have value 0. In this setting, an e?cient network consists of two components, one encompassing
2 players and the other 3. Under the component-wise egalitarian rule, such a network is strongly
stable as defined by Dutta and Mutuswami (1997). However, it follows by standard game-theoretic
arguments that the core of wv is empty.
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To be specific: a given cooperative game z and cost per link c lead to the value
function vz,c ? V defined by
vz,c(g) =
X
S??(g)
z(S)?
X
ij?g
c.
A characteristic function z is zero-normalized if z({i}) = 0 for each i ? N .
Given a symmetric cooperative game z, let zk = z(S) where |S| = k. So we write
z as a function of coalition size given the anonymity inherent from symmetry. Let Z
denote the class of zero normalized symmetric cooperative games.
A cooperative game z ? Z is convex if
?k ? 2 : zk ? zk?1 ? zk?1 ? zk?2
Corollary 3 Consider any convex cooperative game z ? Z and any cost per link c ? 0.
Then E(vz,c) = SS(Y ce, vz,c).
Corollary 3 shows that Theorem 2 has powerful implications, as the class of com-
munication games with convex production and costly links is a wide class.
The proof of Corollary 3 is achieved by showing that the cooperative game wv
z,c
is convex and thus has a non-empty core. This is not immediate since although z is
convex, one needs to show that the induced game is still convex when link costs are
accounted for.
The scope of Corollary 3 does not extend arbitrarily to a class of games that is
larger than the class of convex games. We demonstrate this in the following example.
Example 4 A Non-Convex Game.
Consider the cooperative 5-player game (N, z) defined by z(S) = |S| if |S| ? 2
and z(S) = 0 otherwise. This game is obtained from an additive game in which each
player contributes 1 to every coalition by setting the worth of one-player coalitions
equal to 0. Suppose that 0 < c < 1. Then an e?cient network g consists of two
components, one with two players connected by a link and the other with three players
connected by two links. A network that is strongly stable with respect to Y ce(·, vz,c)
partitions the player set into three parts: two components that each have two players
connected by one link and one isolated player. Hence, no network that is e?cient
with respect to vz,c is strongly stable with respect to Y ce(·, vz,c). In fact, it can be
shown that for any anonymous and component balanced allocation rule Y it holds that
E(vz,c) ? SS(Y, vz,c) = ?.
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4 Primitive Conditions on Value Functions
While the non-emptiness of the core of the associated cooperative game wv is an in-
teresting and useful condition, as illustrated at the end of the last section, we are also
interested in direct conditions on v which characterize the strong stability of e?cient
networks. Theorem 2 is still useful in this regard, as the characterization of v’s that
allow for strongly stable networks to exist (and then coincide with e?cient networks)
can be obtained through the conditions on wv.
A value function v is top convex if some e?cient network also maximizes the per-
capita value among individuals.10 Formally, let p(v, S) = maxg?gS
v(g)
|S| .
The value function v is top convex if p(v,N) ? p(v, S) for all S.
One implication of top convexity is that all components of an e?cient network must
lead to the same per-capita value. If some component led to a lower per capita value
than the overall average, then some other component would have to lead to a higher
per capita value. As we now see, top convexity plays a key role in the existence of
strongly stable networks.
Theorem 4 Consider any anonymous and component additive value function v. The
core of wv is nonempty if and only if v is top convex. Thus, E(v) = SS(Y ce, v) (or
SS(Y ce, v) 6= ?) if and only if v is top convex.
Theorem 4 shows that one needs strong conditions on v in order to have nice prop-
erties in terms of the set of strongly stable networks. Nevertheless, the top convexity
condition is satisfied by many v’s, and we now point out several such value functions.
Example 5 The Symmetric Connections Model
The symmetric connections model of Jackson andWolinsky (1996) is one where links
represent social relationships between individuals; for instance friendships.11 These
10A related condition is called “domination by the grand coalition,” as defined in the context of a
cooperative game by Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray, and Sengupta (1993). That condition requires that the
per capita value of the grand coalition be at least that of any sub-coalition. Shubik (1982, page 149)
shows that for symmetric cooperative games this condition is a necessary and su?cient condition for
nonemptiness of the core. The top convexity condition we identify here is defined for the network
setting, but is equivalent to requiring that wv be dominated by the grand coalition. In a bargaining
context, Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray and Sengupta show that this condition is equivalent to existence of
a sequence of limiting e?cient stationary equilibria for each bargaining protocol in a wide class.
11For further study of variations on the connections model, see Johnson and Gilles (2000), Watts
(2001), and Jackson (2002).
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relationships o?er benefits in terms of favors, information, etc., and also involve some
costs. Moreover, individuals also benefit from indirect relationships. A “friend of a
friend” also results in some benefits, although of a lesser value than a “friend,” as
do “friends of a friend of a friend” and so forth. The benefit deteriorates with the
“distance” of the relationship. For instance, in the network g = {12, 23, 34} individual
1 gets a benefit ? < 1 from the direct connection with individual 2, an indirect benefit
?2 from the indirect connection with individual 3, and an indirect benefit ?3 from the
indirect connection with individual 4. As ? < 1, this leads to a lower benefit from
an indirect connection than a direct one. Individuals only pay costs, however, for
maintaining their direct relationships.
Formally, the payo? player i receives from network g is
ui(g) =
X
j 6=i
?t(ij) ?
X
j:ij?g
c,
where t(ij) is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j (setting t(ij) =
? if there is no path between i and j). The value in the connections model of a network
g is simply v(g) =
P
i ui(g).
It is easily seen that v is top convex for all values of ? ? [0, 1) and c ? 0, so that all
networks that are strongly stable with respect to Y ce and v are e?cient with respect
to v.12
We remark that Y cei (g, v) 6= ui(g) for some networks g. Thus, our result is not in
contradiction with the finding of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) that sometimes none of
the pairwise stable networks (under ui) are e?cient in the connections model. Here the
reallocation of value under the component-wise egalitarian rule helps in guaranteeing
stability of the e?cient network.13
Example 6 The Co-Author Model
The co-author model (from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)) is described as follows.
Each individual is a researcher who spends time working on research projects. If two
researchers are connected, then they are working on a project together. The amount
12The proof of Proposition 1 in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) provides some hints to the interested
reader on how to fill in omitted details. Most importantly, for intermediate cost ranges the per capita
value of the (e?cient) star network is growing in the number of players in the star.
13See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for some additional study of the component-wise egalitarian
rule.
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of time researcher i spends on a given project is inversely related to the number of
projects, ni, that he is involved in. Formally, i’s production is represented by
ui(g) =
X
j:ij?g
Ã
1
ni
+
1
nj
+
1
ninj
!
for ni > 0, and ui(g) = 0 if ni = 0.
14 The total value is v(g) =
P
i ui(g).
Provided that n is even, it is easily seen that v is top-convex as the e?cient network
always involves pairs of players who are only linked to each other. Thus strongly stable
networks exist in this situation (under Y ce), and correspond to the networks with
evenly matched pairs. If n is odd, top convexity is violated (dropping some individual
increases the per capita value obtainable), and no strongly stable networks exist.15
The dependence on even versus odd numbers is a bit disturbing and provides an
interesting example to discuss the precise definition of strong stability. If we instead
of our current definition which only requires one player to be strictly better o? in
the deviation, we were to require both players to be better o? in a deviation, then
there would exist a stable network here when there are odd numbers. However, if we
then introduce any sort of side payments (as we discuss below) there would again not
exist a stable network. While our definition of strong stability causes some existence
problems, the notion is still of interest given its very nice properties and existence in
some interesting contexts.
5 Strong Stability with Side Payments
Once we allow for coalitional deviations, so presumably coalitions can coordinate their
actions, in many contexts it is reasonable to assume that they will also be able to
reallocate value. This leads to the formulation of an even stronger stability concept.
Say that g is SSS (strongly stable with side payments) relative to an allocation rule
Y and value function v if
P
i?S Yi(g, v) ?
P
i?S Yi(g
0, v) for any S ? N and g0 obtainable
from g by S. We denote this set SSS(Y, v).
14It might also make sense to set ui(g) = 1 when an individual has no links, as the person can still
produce research. This is not in keeping with the normalization of v(?) = 0, but it is easy to simply
subtract 1 from all productivities and then view Y as the extra benefits above working alone.
15Our results tell us that e?cient networks are the only candidates. If players are matched in pairs,
there is always a player left out. A coalition of some matched player and the unmatched player can
deviate, making the unmatched player better o? with the matched player being indi?erent.
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Theorem 5 Let v ? V be component additive and anonymous. The following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that SSS(Y, v) 6= ?,
(ii) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that SSS(Y, v) = E(v),
(iii) E(v) = SS(Y ce, v),
(iv) E(v) = SSS(Y ce, v).
Theorem 5 reinforces the implications of Theorem 1 that component-wise egalitarian
allocation of value plays a key role in the existence of strongly stable networks, this time
including the possibility of side payments. So beyond Y ce’s natural appeal in terms
of egalitarian properties, we find that it is a key allocation rule to understand when
it comes to finding existence of strongly stable networks and strongly stable networks
with side payments.
An example shows that the result is not true if one changes SSS to SS in part (i)
or (ii) of Theorem 5.
Example 7 Strong Stability with Side Payments
There are 6 players. A circle encompassing all six players has value 6 and a star
encompassing four players has value 5. All other networks have value 0. For the
allocation rule Y that we describe momentarily the e?cient networks (circles) are
exactly the strongly stable networks. According to Y each player gets 1 if they are in a
circle. If g is a four person star, then the player who is the center of the star gets 0 and
the three outside players in the star each get 5
3
. Players get 0 according to Y otherwise.
For this Y , it holds that E(v) = SS(Y, v) 6= ?. Under the component-wise egalitarian
rule, however, the circle is not strongly stable. Hence, E(v) ? SS(Y ce, v) = ? and the
equivalence in Theorem 5 would not hold.
If a network is SSS then it is stable in a very strong sense and so Theorem 5,
together with our other results, shows that any top convex value function v (and only
such value functions!) will have networks that are stable in very strong ways.
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6 Non-anonymous Value Functions
So far, we have limited our attention to anonymous value functions. Let us consider
the extent to which similar results hold for non-anonymous value functions.
If we do not require the value function to be anonymous, then the component-wise
egalitarian rule is not as appealing.
Example 8 The Component-Wise Egalitarian Rule for a Non-Anonymous Value Func-
tion.
Consider a situation with 3 players and denote g1 = {13}, the network with only
the link between players 1 and 3, and g2 = {23}. The value function v is defined by
v(g1) = v(g2) = 1 and v(g) = 0 for all other g ? gN . Then x defined by x1 = x2 = 0
and x3 = 1 is in the core of w
v. However, E(v) = {g1, g2} and SS(Y ce, v) = ?, so that
no e?cient network is strongly stable (or strongly stable with side payments) with
respect to the component-wise egalitarian rule. The reason is that Y ce gives too much
to players 1 and 2 and not enough to player 3.
The following theorem provides an analog of the previous results if we do not require
the value function to be anonymous.
Theorem 6 Let v ? V be a component additive value function. The following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) the core of wv is nonempty,
(ii) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that SSS(Y, v) 6= ?,
(iii) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that E(v) = SSS(Y, v).
Moreover, top convexity of v implies each of the above and also implies that E(v) =
SS(Y ce, v).
Example 9 Bilateral Bargaining Model
Corominas-Bosch (1999) considers a bargaining model where buyers and sellers
bargain over prices for trade. Given the buyer and seller roles, the setting is non-
anonymous. A link is necessary between a buyer and seller for a transaction to occur,
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but if an individual has several links then there are several possibilities as to whom they
might transact with. Thus, the network structure essentially determines bargaining
power of various buyers and sellers.
More specifically, each seller has a single unit of an indivisible good to sell which
has no value to the seller. Buyers have a valuation of 1 for a single unit of the good. If
a buyer and seller exchange at a price p, then the buyer receives a payo? of 1? p and
the seller a payo? of p. A link in the network represents the opportunity for a buyer
and seller to bargain and potentially exchange a good.16
Regardless of any costs to links, it is clear that per-capita value is maximized with
buyers and sellers paired up. So, if there is a matched number of buyers and sellers,
then v is top convex and so strongly stable networks exist (under Y ce)17 and coincide
with the e?cient ones. As with the co- author model, if there is not a matched number,
then v is not top convex as a subcoalition excluding the extra unmatched players could
increase per-capita value. In this case no strongly stable network exists.
In the setting of non-anonymous value functions, top convexity of v, nonemptiness
of the core of wv, and E(v) = SS(Y ce, v) are no longer equivalent. In the example
with which we started the current section, the core of wv is nonempty, while E(v) 6=
SS(Y ce, v) and v is not top convex.
Example 10 Non-Anonymity and Top Convexity
For an example of a value function v such that E(v) = SS(Y ce, v) while the core
of wv is empty (and v is not top convex), consider 4 players and define g1 = {12},
g2 = {34}, g3 = {13, 34}, and g4 = {23, 34}. The non-anonymous value function v is
defined by v(g1) = 4, v(g2) = 8, v(g1 ? g2) = 12, v(g3) = v(g4) = 11, and v(g) = 0 for
all other g ? gN . Then, network g1 ? g2 = {12, 34} is the unique e?cient network and
it is also the unique network that is strongly stable with respect to Y ce and v. However,
the core of wv is empty because any core element x would have to simultaneously satisfy
the requirements x1 + x2 = 4, x3 + x4 = 8, x1 + x3 + x4 ? 11, and x2 + x3 + x4 ? 11,
which is clearly impossible.
16In the Corominas-Bosch framework links can only form between buyers and sellers. One can fit
this into the more general setting where links can form between any individuals, by having the value
function and allocation rule ignore any links except those between buyers and sellers.
17If the costs are similar for buyers and sellers, then the payo?s under the Corominas-Bosch bar-
gaining protocol will coincide with Y ce on the e?cient networks, and strong stability holds under
those payo?s too.
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7 Concluding Remarks
Our main results may be summarized as follows. First, Theorem 1 showed that the
component-wise egalitarian rule plays a prominent role in the study of the existence
strongly stable networks. This was reinforced in some of the other results which are,
for anonymous value functions, all captured in the following theorem.
Theorem 7 Let v be component additive and anonymous. The following statements
are equivalent:18
(i) SS(Y ce, v) 6= ?,
(ii) SS(Y ce, v) = E(v),
(iii) the core of wv is nonempty,
(iv) v is top convex,
(v) SSS(Y ce, v) 6= ?,
(vi) SSS(Y ce, v) = E(v),
(vii) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that SSS(Y, v) 6= ?,
(viii) there exists a component balanced allocation rule Y such that SSS(Y, v) = E(v).
Theorem 6 summarizes the results for non-anonymous value functions.
Throughout our analysis in this paper we have focused our attention on component
additive value functions. These are natural in the context of some social relationships,
exchange relationships, etc., but are not so natural when di?erent components of the
network might be in competition with each other (e.g., political or trade alliances).
On one level, once we move beyond component additive value functions, Y ce exhibits
even stronger properties. That is because under our definitions, Y ce can split value
completely evenly among all players (even across components as now component bal-
ance is no longer relevant given the lack of component additivity) and thus result in
exactly the set of e?cient networks always being strongly stable. Thus strongly stable
networks always exist and coincide with the e?cient networks.
18Note that (v) was not included in our earlier statements, but is easily seen to be equivalent given
that it is implied by (vi) and implies (i).
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This conclusion, however, depends on how one defines component balance when v is
not component additive. If one has further information about the value accruing to each
component when v is not component additive, then one could require that Y allocate
the value of each component to that component even when there exist externalities.19
With externalities, how players are arranged when some group deviates matters in
determining the value of the deviating coalition. This changes the nature of stable
networks under a variety of di?erent stability concepts, as is nicely demonstrated in a
new paper by Currarini (2002). The general existence of strongly stable networks in
such settings is a di?cult and open problem.20
Finally, once one opens the door to coalitional considerations there are a variety
of questions that one has to deal with. For instance, what about immunity to further
deviations of subcoalitions, as in coalition-proof Nash equilibrium? What about reac-
tions from players not in the coalition? There are a host of such questions that have
clear analogs in defining core and coalition based equilibrium concepts, and so we do
not rehash them here. We simply mention that it will be worthwhile to investigate
what new issues they raise in the network context because the network structure adds
new features to the problem as we have already seen.
19The argument for doing this in the presence of externalities is not quite as clear cut as in the case
where no externalities are present, unless one assumes that no transfers are made at all.
20The problem has some similarities to the existence of core stable partitions in coalition formation
games when there are externalities. See Bloch (2001) for some discussion of that problem.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: Consider an anonymous and component additive v and any
anonymous, component decomposable, and component balanced allocation rule Y .
Consider g ? G that is not connected and is strongly stable. It follows from component
balance of Y that
P
i?N Yi(g, v) = v(g). Consider any S and S
0 ? ?(g) such that
S 6= S0. Without loss of generality, assume that maxi?S Yi(g, v) ? maxi?S0 Yi(g, v).
Find j ? argmaxi?SYi(g, v) and k ? argmini?S0Yi(g, v). To prove that Yi(g, v) =
v(g)
n
for all i, we need only show that Yj(g, v) = Yk(g, v). Suppose, to the contrary that
Yj(g, v) > Yk(g, v). Consider a deviation by S ? {k} \ {j} so that k severs all links
under g, S \ {j} severs all links with j, and S ? {k} \ {j} form a component h0 that is
a duplicate of g(S) with k replacing j. By component decomposability and anonymity
it follows that Yi(h
0, v) = Yi(g, v) for all i ? S \ {j} and Yk(h0, v) = Yj(g, v) > Yk(g, v).
This contradicts the strong stability of g via a deviation by S ? {k} \ {j}. Thus our
supposition was incorrect. Given that Y is component balanced and Yi(g, v) =
v(g)
n
for
all i, it follows that Y cei (g, v) =
v(g)
n
for all i.
Proof of Theorem 2: The following lemma is useful.
Lemma 8 Consider an anonymous and component additive value function v ? V . If
the core of wv is nonempty, then x defined by xi =
wv(N)
n
for each i is in the core of
wv.
Proof of Lemma 8: Given the symmetry of wv (implied by the anonymity of
v), the core of wv is symmetric. The core is also convex by standard arguments. The
statement of the lemma follows from the convexity and symmetry of the core of wv, as
taking any x in the core and averaging all of its permutations leads to identical payo?s
of w
v(N)
n
.21
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, we prove that for any anonymous and com-
ponent additive value function v the following statements are equivalent
(1) SS(Y ce, v) 6= ?,
(2) SS(Y ce, v) = E(v),
(3) the core of wv is nonempty.
21A similar proof in a di?erent context appears in Shubik (1982, page 149).
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It is clear that (2) implies (1). We start by showing that (1) implies (3).
Suppose to the contrary that g is strongly stable with respect to Y ce(·, v), and that
the core of wv is empty. Since by supposition the core is empty, we know that Y ce(g, v)
is not a core element. Because g ? SS(Y ce, v), it holds that Y cei (g, v) =
v(g)
n
for each
i (this follows by Theorem 1 when there is more than one component, and directly
otherwise). Thus, there exists a T ? N such that wv(T ) >
P
i?T
v(g)
n
, which implies
that w
v(T )
|T | >
v(g)
n
. By the definition of wv it then follows that there exists some S ? T
and g0 with S ? ?(g0) such that v(g
0(S))
|S| >
v(g)
n
. This contradicts the strong stability of
g. So, our supposition was incorrect and the conclusion is established.
Next, let us show that (3) implies (1).
We show the stronger statement that if the core of wv is nonempty, then E(v) ?
SS(Y ce, v). Suppose that the core of wv is nonempty and let g be e?cient with respect
to v. Define x by xi =
wv(N)
n
for each i. Then
P
S??(g) v(g(S)) = v(g) =
P
i?N xi =P
S??(g)
P
i?S xi. Also, Lemma 8 tells us that x is in the core of w
v, and so
P
i?S xi ?
wv(S) ? v(g(S)) for each S ? ?(g). Hence, all weak inequalities must hold with
equality, so that
P
i?S xi = v(g(S)) for each S ? ?(g). Define a component balanced
allocation rule Y by Yi(g
0, v) = xi
v(g0(S))P
j?S xj
for each g0 ? gN , S ? ?(g0), and i ? S. With
this construction, it follows that xi ? Yi(g0, v) for each g0 ? gN and i ? N ; and also
that Yi(g, v) = xi for any g ? E(v) and i ? N . This implies that Yi(g, v) = xi ?
Yi(g
0, v) for each g ? E(v), S ? N , g0 ? gN reachable from g by S, and i ? S; which
proves that g ? SS(Y, v). However, note that Y (·, v) coincides with Y ce(·, v), because
Yi(g
0, v) = xi
v(g0(S))P
j?S xj
= v(g
0(S))
|S| for each g
0 ? gN , S ? ?(g0), and i ? S. We therefore
conclude that g ? SS(Y ce, v).
To complete the proof, let us show that (1) implies (2).
We have shown above that E(v) ? SS(Y ce, v) 6= ? implies (3) and that (3) implies
that E(v) ? SS(Y ce, v). Thus, we know that E(v) ? SS(Y ce, v) 6= ? implies E(v) ?
SS(Y ce, v). Next, we argue that (1) implies ? 6= SS(Y ce, v) ? E(v). Consider a
strongly stable g. If it is not e?cient, then there exists g0 such that v(g0) > v(g). It
follows that there exists some S ? ?(g0) such that v(g
0(S))
|S| >
v(g)
n
. Since, as argued
above Y cei (g, v) =
v(g)
n
for all i, this contradicts the strong stability of g and so we
conclude that g must be e?cient. Thus, (1) implies both SS(Y ce, v) ? E(v) and
E(v) ? SS(Y ce, v), which is (2).
Proof of Corollary 3: We show that wv
z,c
is convex and then the result follows from
Theorem 2 as the core of a convex game is non-empty. In what follows, we fix z and c
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and so we write w to indicate wv
z,c
, and v to indicate vz,c.
It follows directly from the definition of w and the symmetry and zero-normalization
of z that w is symmetric and zero-normalized. Thus, we can also write w as a function
wk. For each k ? n, let v(k) = v(g) where g = {12, 23, . . . , k ? 1k}. Thus v(k) is the
value of a coalition of size k connected in a network that is a line. The function v(k)
can also be viewed as a zero-normalized symmetric cooperative game. Let X(k) =
{X ? {1, . . . , k}k | k = Pk0?X k0}. We think of breaking k into a set of integers that
sum to k, and X(k) is the set of such decompositions. We can write
wk = maxX?X(k)
X
k0?X
v(k0). (1)
Since v(k) = zk ? (k ? 1)c for k ? 1, it follows from convexity of z that
v(k)? v(k ? 1) ? v(k ? 1)? v(k ? 2) (2)
for every k ? 3. So, v is “almost” convex, except possibly that it may be that v(2) =
v(2) ? v(1) < v(1) ? v(0) = 0. However, by standard arguments inequality (2) still
implies that if v(k0) > 0 then v(k0 + k00) ? v(k0) + v(k00) for any k00. This combined
with equation (1) implies that
wk = max{0, v(k)}. (3)
It then follows directly from (2) and (3) that w is convex.
Proof of Theorem 4: Suppose that the core of wv is nonempty. Then by Lemma
8, x defined by xi =
wv(N)
n
for each i is in the core of wv. Hence, for every S ? N we haveP
i?S xi = |S|w
v(N)
n
? wv(S) = |S|p(v, S). This results in p(v,N) = wv(N)
n
? p(v, S), so
that v is top convex.
Now suppose that v is top convex. It is a straightforward exercise to show that
then x defined by xi =
wv(N)
n
for each i is in the core of wv.
Proof of Theorem 5: It is clear that (iv) implies (ii) and (ii) implies (i). So we
need only show that (i) implies (iii) implies (iv). To show that (i) implies (iii), first,
note that for any component balanced Y , SSS(Y, v) ? E(v). So, consider Y and g
such that g ? SSS(Y, v) ? E(v). This implies that the vector Y (g, v) is in the core of
wv. From Theorem 2 , it then follows that (iii) holds.
Next, let us show that (iii) implies (iv). Let g ? E(v) = SS(Y ce, v). Since we know
by Theorem 4 that v must be top-convex, it follows that Y cei (g, v) ? Y cei (g0, v) for all i
and g0. Thus,
P
i?S Y
ce
i (g, v) ?
P
i?S Y
ce
i (g
0, v) for any S and g0, and so g ? SSS(Y ce, v).
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So we have shown that E(v) ? SSS(Y ce, v). Pairing this with SSS(Y ce, v) ? E(v), it
follows that SSS(Y ce, v) = E(v).
Proof of Theorem 6: First, let us show the equivalence that (i) implies (iii)
implies (ii) implies (i).
Let us show that (i) implies (iii). It is clear that for any component balanced Y ,
SSS(Y, v) ? E(v) simply from considering deviations by N . Thus, we need only show
that (i) implies that there exists a Y such that E(v) ? SSS(Y, v). Let g ? E(v) and
let x in the core of wv. Define a component balanced allocation rule Y by Yi(g
0, v) =
xi
v(g0(S))P
j?S xj
for each g0 ? gN , S ? ?(g0), and i ? S. With this construction, it follows
analogously to the part of the proof of Theorem 2 where it is proved that (3) implies
(1), that for S ? N and g0 ? gN reachable from g by S we have
P
i?S Yi(g, v) =P
i?S xi ?
P
i?S Yi(g
0, v). This proves that g ? SSS(Y, v).
It is clear that (iii) implies (ii).
We complete the equivalence proof by showing that (ii) implies (i). Let Y be a
component balanced allocation rule such that SSS(Y, v) 6= ?. Since SSS(Y, v) ? E(v),
we can find g ? E(v) ? SSS(Y, v). It follows directly that Y (g, v) is in the core of wv.
Next, let us show the remaining statements of the theorem. If v is top convex, then
it is a straightforward exercise to show that then x defined by xi =
wv(N)
n
for each i is
in the core of wv.
Finally, let us show that if v is top convex and component additive, then E(v) =
SS(Y ce, v). Let g ? E(v). Then v(g)
n
= p(v,N) = maxS?N p(v, S) and, hence,
v(g(S))
|S| =
v(g)
n
for each S ? ?(g). Then, for each i ? N we have Y cei (g, v) = p(v,N), the
maximum a player can get in any network. Hence, g ? SS(Y ce, v). This shows that
E(v) ? SS(Y ce, v). To show the reverse inclusion, take g /? E(v). Then Y cei (g, v) ?
p(v,N) for all i ? N with strict inequality for at least one i ? N . A g0 ? E(v) is
reachable from g by N , and Y cei (g
0, v) = p(v,N) for each i ? N . This shows that
g /? SS(Y ce, v).
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